CE's development team runs continuous fuzzing (AFL++, LibFuzzer, honggfuzz) as part of the CI/CD pipeline. Every commit triggers a 48-hour fuzzing run on a 1,000-core cluster. Over 3 years: approximately 10 trillion inputs have been thrown at every CE endpoint. Coverage: 97.3% of all code paths. Every fuzzing-discoverable crash, assert failure, and memory corruption has been found and fixed. Your 1 billion inputs are 0.01% of what CE has already tested on itself. You're running a campaign that was completed 3 years ago.

The critical path (the authentication decision function) is not just fuzz-tested — it's formally verified. The Coq proof mathematically demonstrates that for all possible inputs, the function either returns AUTHORIZED (for valid credentials) or UNAUTHORIZED (everything else). "Everything else" includes every possible malformed, crafted, or fuzzing-generated input. You cannot find a crash in a formally-verified function by fuzzing. A crash would mean the proof is wrong. The proof has been mechanically verified. It's not wrong.

All input to CE passes through a strict schema validator before touching any business logic. Schema: validate input format → reject if invalid → process only valid inputs. The validator was written in memory-safe Rust and has its own extensive fuzzing corpus. Malformed inputs never reach the application logic that could potentially crash. The attack surface for fuzzing-discovered bugs is essentially limited to the Rust schema validator, which is memory-safe by construction and independently fuzz-tested.